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The Patten administration has been lurching around in recent years
searching for a community consensus to legitimate reform of Hong Kong's
aged income support system. It seems to consider that the existing system,
which combines social assistance (means-tested age pensions and benefits)
with social allowances (universal benefits to categories of the aged
population) (Dixon & Chow , 1992) , will be unable , alone , to meet the
income-security needs of the elderly in Hong Kong after 1997. The reason
for this concern can only be speculated upon, but perhaps it reflects a belief,
or indeed an expectation, that the future Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region government might not give aged income support the priority
needed to protect the basic living standards of Hong Kong' s aged population,
given the almost inevitable increase in government expenditure on the

,

aged that vill result from Hong Kong's ageing population in the years to
come .
The dual purpose of this paper is:
•

to provide a context for the Patten administration's latest , and
perhaps its last, aged income-support system reform prescription
in terms of possible policy goals , the broad spectrum of incomesupport strategies available , and the internationally-recognised
minimum standards for social security programs; and

•

to set out a specific program design agenda related to program
coverage , withdrawal contingencies , program financing and
program administration that the Patten administration needs to
address when developing its latest proposed aged income-support
program.
AGED INCOME-SUPPORT REFORM

Under the rubric of income support for the aged comes a wide variety
of mandatory public measures that provide cash payments , and perhaps inkind benefits , in the event of an individual's earning power permanently
ceasing due to retirement or the attainment of a designated age (Dixon,
1986). These public measures (or programs) can be designed to meet any of
many policy goals.
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Aged Income-Support Policy Goals
There are a wide variety of sometimes conflicting aged income-support
goals that might be sought by a government seeking to introduce an aged
income-support program (Dixon. 1994), including:
•

to ameliorate poverty amongst the existing aged;
to prevent poverty amongst the aged in the fu ture;

•

•

to achieve a specific form of income redistribution, such as:
•

from employers to their employees upon retirement;

•

from higher income groups to the aged in poverty;

•

from current employees to the current aged; or

•

from current employees to themselves at retirelnent; and

to minimise (or maximise) the current or future cost burden of
aged income support on:

•

government;

•

employers; or

•

employees.

The social norms that infiltrate and mould a society's perceptions of
hat constitutes the appropriate set of goals for its aged income support
system are the result of an accumulation of preferences generated by a
people as they shape their specific society. The dominant set of values that
determine how a society views aged income-support is a crucial factor in the
determining the broad contours of the building blocks that the social security
technocrats sculpt and adorn to construct their systems.

,,,,

Aged Income-Support Models
A government seeking to design an aged income-support program to
achieve specific policy goals in the context of an existing system of meanstested and universal-categorical age pensions and benefits can eclecticly draw
upon the features of three major income-support models: mandatory
retirement insurance (social insurance) or mandatory occupational
3

retirement savings (national provident funds) and tax-minimising or taxdeferring voluntary retirement benefit programs.
Mandatory Retirement Insurance. This is an employment-related approach
whereby benefit eligibility is usually based direc t1 y or indirec t1 y on satisfying
either a minimum covered employment period or a minimum
contribution period. The benefits provided upon retirement, or after the
attainment of a designated age, are usually periodic cash pensions related to
current or past earning or to past contributions paid , although uniform flatrate pensions and lump sum benefits can be paid. These benefits are
financed entirely, or in part, by specific mandatory contributions (generally
specified as a percentage of earnings) paid by participating employers and
their covered employees usually to a publicly-administered fund , with,
perhaps , a government subsidy , although privately-administered pension
funds are not unknown (Ryser , 1992; Santamar泊， 1992).
Mandatory Occupational Retirement Savings. Under this employmentrelated approach participating employees and their covered employers must
pay regular contributions to a publicly-administered provident fund , which
are credited to a separate account maintained for each covered employee.
The balance in those accounts attracts interest and is usually payable in a
lump sum upon retirement , the attainment of a designated age , or some
other designated event (such as death or emigration) , although interim
withdra\val right , borrowing rights , periodic disbursements and even
annuities can be accommodated.
Voluntary Retirement Benefit. Under this approach, employers , employees
and individuals can be induced into a variety of voluntary retirement
benefit programs by making them tax-minimising or tax-deferring
mechanisms. There are two broad program categories. The first contains
voluntary retirement insurance programs , which usually take the form of
either private occupational superannuation (usually involving both
employer and employee contributions and pension and/or lump-sum
payments) or individual superannuation policies with insurance companies
(usually involving lump-sum and/or pension payments). The second
category contains voluntary retirement savings programs , which usually
take the form of private occupational provident funds (usually involving
both employer and employee contributions and lump-sum payments) ,
individual retirement savings account with financial institutions , or
retirement savings bonds.
4

The Patten Administration's Search for a Suitable Supplementary Aged
Income-Support Program
The policy development process that the Patten administration began
in the early 1990s, in the hope of building a community consensus about the
appropriate form that a supplementary aged income-support program
should take , has been characterised by ill-defined policy goals and by the
sequential proffering of alternative inadequately-specified income-support
programs. Although there has been a conspicuous lack of well-defined
policy goals , the Patten administration would seem to be shifting away from
the long-standing Hong Kong policy goal of only seeking to ameliorate
lnodestly aged poverty (with minimal vertical income-redistributive
consequences and at the government's expense) towards embracing the goal
of preventing, albeit in a modest way, the occurrence of such poverty some
t Ï1ne long into the future (,,,, ith minimal inter-temporal vertical incomeredistributive consequences and not at the government's expense) . The
willingness of the Patten administration to articulate only generic policy
strategies (shifting from a privately-administered provident fund system to a
pay-as-you-go social insurance system , and virtua11y back again) without
specifying a11 the detailed program design features has not a110wed a
complete analysis of these various income-support strategies to be
undertaken. This applies to the latest, and perhaps last, policy prescription:
a mandatory occupational retirement savings program (euphemistica11y
called a lvfandatory Provident Fund system).

MANDATORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SA VINGS :
AN INADEQUA TE AGED INCOME SUPPORT STRA TEGY
Envisioned by the Patten administration is an employment-related ,
private-sector administered , mandatory occupational retirement saving
program , which would operate in tandem with Hong Kong's existing aged
income-support system (Willis , 1995). It would mandate most employees
under the aged of 65 to contribute probably five per cent of their salaries ,
with matching employer contributions , subject to a (yet to be specified) salary
floor and ceiling, to registered private provident funds under contract to
their employers. There would be requirements for preservation and
portability until these employees reach retirement age (presumably 65 years
of age) except in the event of death, total disability and permanent departure
from Hong Kong. A "residual pool scheme" would be established to ensure
that coverage is available to those employees whose coverage is deemed to
5

be an unprofitab1e undertaking for registered private provident funds.
These contributions , with accumu1ated interest 1ess administrative fees ,
vvou1d be paid to covered emp10yees upon their attairunent of a designated
retirement age.
Program administration wou1d be undertaken by the designated registered
private provident funds , subject to a regu1atory regime that wou1d , at 1east,
require the private provident fund industry to accept responsibility
collective1y for any financia1 10sses incurred by a particu1ar private provident
fund as a resu1t of theft, fraud or some other breach of the 1a\v by an
emp10yee of tha t fund.
The policy prescription being offered by the Patten administration
presumes that acceptab1e aged inCOllì. e support can be provided by means of
mandatory savings \vithout risk-pooling. In terms of the Internationa1
Labour Office's (ILO's) Socia1 Security (Minimum Standard) Convention ,
1952 , which provides a 1ong-standing, internationally accepted set of

conservative benchmarks for the design of adequate socia1 security programs
in both deve10ping and developed countries , mandatory occupational
retirement savings programs provide inadequate aged income support
(Dixon, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990 & 1993; Dixon & Chow , 1992).
Lump Sum Benefits
The 1952 ILO Convention endorses only the use of periodic payments ,
expressed as either a percentage of a beneficiary's previous earnings , for a
particular period of t Ílne (artic1es 63 and 64) or an income-tested flat-rate
"sufficient to maintain the fami1 y of the beneficiary in heal th and decency"
(artic1e 65) to meet social security needs. The provision of lump-sum
benefits is thus an inferior form of socia1 security payment because the
payments are not determined in accordance with social security needs , rather
they are the product of past savings. Because mandatory occupational
retirement savings programs are unable to ensure that their beneficiaries use
their 1ump-sum payments to provide for themse1ves a future source of
income, they cannot guarantee that their beneficiaries do not quick1y become
impoverished , as inflation eats away at their means of suppor t. Hence the
ab i1 ity of mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings programs to protect
covered emp10yees in the event of the 10ss of their earning power after
retirement depends on the efficacy of the 1ump-sum payment. The extent to
which such payments can provide adequate aged income support depends
6

on the level of accumulated savings ava i1 able for final withdravval , the uses
to which that savings are put, and the rate of inflation.
The Problem of Inadequate Savings. This is one of the major dilemmas
confronting mandatory occupational retirement savings programs seeking
to provide adequate aged income suppor t. The accumulated savings
available for final withdrawal would be greater:
•

the higher the contribution rates payable;
the higher the income to which that rate applies;

•

the longer the contribution period (or the shorter the periods
of unemployment or uncovered employment);

•

the higher the interest accrued on that savings;

.

the smaller the administrative charges deducted from that
savlngs;

•

.

the smaller proportion of outstanding (uncollected)
contributions; and
the

smaller

any interim withdrawals

(or

unrepaid

borrowings) permitted from that savings.
One particular issue need to be highlighted in this contex t. The continuous
contribution period that must elapse before covered employees can
accumulate adequate savings to finance their retirement is some 25 years , on
the rule-of-thumb basis that vvith a 10 per cent combined employeremployee contribution rate it takes at least five years to accumulate savings
equivalent to one year's salary and that the target income-replacement rate is
25 percent.
The Dispersal of Lump-Sum Payments. The way in which lump-sum
payments are spent determines the extent to which this form of benefit
provides adequate aged income support. The principle justification for a
lump-sum payment is that it provides the beneficiary with the wherewithal
to acquire income-generating assets , so as to avoid subsequent recourse to
any form of social assistance. This does not, however, guarantee that the
accumulated savings are used to this end.
Inflation. The effectiveness of mandatory occupational retirement savings
programs providing lump-sum payments as a means of providing adequate
7

aged income support is affected by inflation in two ways. First, any inflation
occurring over the contribution period reduces the real value of the
accumulated savings unless the net interest rate (that is , nominal interest
rate less administrative charges) earned exceeds the inflation rate over that
period. Second , any inflation occurring after the final lump-sum payment
has been made reduces the real value of the benefits generated by its
dispersal , which provides a clear incentive to divert this payment to current
rather than to future consumption. 1n both situations , inflation diminishes
the capacity of lump-sum payments to provide adequate aged income
suppor t.
Employee Coverage
The 1952 ILO's Convention established three alternative minimum
coverage standards: not less than 20 per cent of all residents; all residents
\vith means below a particular limit; or not less than 50 per cent of all
en1ployees in industrial work places employing 20 persons or more. The
envisioned mandatory occupational retirement savings program for Hong
Kong will probably meet the third requirements within a reasonable period
of time , given that the existing voluntary private provident funds have
achieved a coverage of 30 per cent of the workforce (Willis , 1995). It must be
recognised , however , that mandatory occupational retirement savings
programs provide the most generous aged income support to those covered
employees who have the highest incomes and who have not experienced
periods of either unemployment , uncovered employment or absence from
the workforce. Unquestionably , the less fortunate receive less income
support, which is a product of the lack of risk-pooling.
Distribution of Costs
The 1952 ILO Convention requires that the costs of social security
protection be met by means of contributions or taxes "in a manner of which
avoid hardship to persons of small means" (article 67). The specification of a
contribution floor under the envisioned mandatory occupational retirement
savings program for Hong Kong would reduce the financial hardship caused
by payment of the designated employee contributions by low-income
covered employees. Yet it is this very group that is vulnerable and most
likely to fall into the social assistance safety ne t.
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INCOME-SUPPORT PROGRAM DESIGN PARAMETERS
In proffering a mandatory occupational retirement savings program the
Patten administration is following in the path of Australia , Chile and , more
recen t1 y , Mexico by endeavouring to create a mandatory occupational
retirement benefit program administered by the private sector (McCallum ,
1988; Borzutzky , 1990; Ryser , 1992; Santamaria , 1992).
The Patten
administration's aspiration is , however, to build upon , through integration,
the coverage achieved by extant voluntary occupational provident funds.
The alternative might be to establish a new mandatory occupational
retirement savings program that would fill the coverage gap left by the
voluntary occupational provident funds. This would mean that members of
existing private provident funds could be exempted from the mandatory
program's coverage , although they could be given the right to select into it if
they consider its benefits to be superior to those offered by their own
voluntary occupational provident fund. The contracting out of the
mandatory program's administration to one or lTIOre private occupational
provident funds could still take place. This could solve thorny policy and
legal issues in rela tion to existing contractual obliga tions tha t might
othenvise have implications for the statutory imposition of any minimum
program requirements and perhaps for instituting portability between
constituent private provident funds.
What follows is an attempt to articulate a design agenda for a
mandatory occupational retirement savings program. This has been done
on the basis that making mandatory membership of what were previously
voluntary occupational provident funds places a responsibility on
government to ensure that its aged income support objectives (what ever
they may be) are cost-effectively achieved by the articulation of minimum
program requirement that would be common to all constituent private
provident funds. This is not to suggest, however , that diversity is not
important.
Rather , it is a reflection on the fact that the Patten
administration, in the Hong Kong tradition, is creating a profitable regulated
market for the private sector to exploit, thus necessitating the need for a
regulatory regime that ensures that public policy goals and private profit
goals do not become incongruous or even incompatible.
Program Coverage
The program design questions relating to coverage that need to be
addressed are:
9

•

Should all industries be covered?

If not, which industries

should be exempt from coverage and upon what basis should
any such exemptions be granted (for example , intensity of
international competition)?
•

Should all employers be covered? If not , which type of
employers should be exempt from coverage and upon "\t\l hat
basis should any such exemptions be granted (for example ,
those with less than five employees)?

•

Should all occupational groups be covered? If not, "\t\l hich
occupational groups should be exempt from coverage and
upon what basis should any such exemptions be granted (for
example , professionals (such as lawyers and medical
practitioners) , civil servants and domestic servants)?

•

Should all em ployees be covered? If not, "\t\l hich type of
employees should be exempt frOlTI coverage and upon what
basis should any such exemptions be granted (for example ,
casual employees , junior employees , apprentices , casual
employees , temporary employees , fixed-period contract
employees with no right of abode in Hong Kong , employees
in equivalent private plans administered outside Hong
Kong , employees earning less than a specified minimum
income (as distinct from the specification of a contribution
floor) , and employees earning more than a specified
maximum income (as distinct from the specification of a
contribution ceiling))?

•

•

Should the self-employed be required to participate?
•

If yes , "\t\l hat rate of contribution should they pay?

•

If not, should voluntary participation be permitted?
Should voluntary participation be open to any person
yvho is not required to contribute?

Should coverage extend to Hong Kong residents with a right
of abode who are employed outside Hong Kong by Hong
Kong-based em ployers?

The responses to these questions "\t\l ill determine the degree of program
coverage achieved. This will determine the extent to which the social
10

assistance system will be relieved of a financial burden in the future. Not
addressed , of course , is the fundamental question of what aged income
support should be available to those outside covered employment.
Withdrawal Contingencies
The program design questions relating to the contingencies that will
perrr吐t the withdrawal of accumulated net savings are:
What should be the designated eligibility age? Should it be
the same for men and women? If not, w ha t should the
differential be?
•

Should resignation or termination of covered employment
be a withdrawal contingency?
•

If yes , should the withdra\vn savings be subject to any
tax liability?
If yes , at what rate(s)? Should tax deferral until
retirement from any employment , or full or
partial tax exemption, be granted if the withdra\vn
savings are rolled over into a retirement savings
account (that is , an account with a financial
institution that is not accessible until the
attainment of designated age without the payment
of the tax liability due) or used to purchase a
retirement annuity?
•

•

If not , should the threat of taxation be used to
encourage the rolling over of the withdrawn funds
into a retirement savings account or the purchase
of a retirement annuity?

Should retirement from any employment at the designated
age be a withdrawal eligibility condition?

•

If yes , should early retirement be permitted for any
employees? If yes , how many years earlier? In which
industries should covered employees be permitted to
retire early (for example , dangerous or hazardous
industries)?
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•

•

If not, should the withdrawn savings be subject to any
tax liability?
•

If yes , at what rate(s)? Should tax deferral until
retirement from any employment, or full or partial
tax exemption, be granted if the withdrawn savings
are rolled over into a retirement savings account
or used to purchase a retirement annui ty?

•

If not , should the threat of taxation be used to
encourage the rolling over of the withdrawn funds
into a retirement savings account or the purchase
of a retirement annuity?

Should death be a \vithdravval contingency?
•

If yes , who should be permitted to be the beneficiary?
Any individual nominated by a covered employees?
The covered employees':

•

legal spouses and dependant children only?

•

訂戶 cto

•

dependant siblings?

•

dependant parents?

•

other dependant relatives?

•

other dependant individuals (for example , for
indi vid uals in long-standing homosexual
relationships)? If yes , should there be a consent
provision?

spouses and their dependant children?

Should the distribution of the accumulated savings
amongst designated or designated beneficiaries be
determined by statute?
Should the withdrawn savings be subject to any tax
liability? If yes , at what rate(s)?

•

If not , how should the accumulated savings be
distributed?
12

•

Should the complete or partial withdrawal of accumulated
savings be permi位ed in the event of:
•

permanent emigration by residents with the right of
abode in Hong Kong? If yes , how is permanent
emigration established?

•

permanent departure by fixed-period contract employees
with no right of abode in Hong Kong?
permanent total or partial incapacity or invalidity
(beyond a specified degree) at any age or after a
designa ted age?

•

unemployment of more than a specified minimum
period or after a designated age?

•

permanent retirement from covered employment at
any age or after a specified minimum period of
contribution?

•

marriage and pernlanent retirement from covered
enlployment by women?

If yes , should the vvithdrawn savings in any of these
circumstances be subject to any tax liability? If yes , at what
rate(s)?
•

Should borrovving up to a specified proportion of the
accumulated savings , with or without the payment of
interest, be permitted for , say:
•

home purchase?
social obligations (such as marriages and funerals)?

•

children's education?

•

medical and hospital care?

The responses to these questions wiU determine the extent to which the
mandatory occupational retirement savings program will provide even
modest material support for retired covered employees. The dilemma is
that since contributors are able to identify their mandatory savings they are
13

inclined to claim proprietary rights over them. This brings into focus the
libertarian principle that since individuals should be considered the best
judges of their well being, they should be able to use, perhaps within limits ,
"their" mandatory savings to improve their immediate quality of life" ,
which is a principle that has been accepted by all national provident funds
11

(Dixon, 1993).
Not addressed , of course is whether and how society should provide
income support to those mandatory occupational retirement savings
program beneficiaries who choose not to use the lump-sum payment for the
income 圓 support purposes they were intended:
•

Should lump-sum payment beneficiaries be designated as
ineligible for social assistance?
•

If yes , should ineligibility apply 0叫Y if their withdrawn
savings are above a designated minimum level? For
how long , or to what age , should they remain
ineligible?

•

•

If not, how should the withdrawal benefits , especially
any non-income-earning assets purchased from those
proceeds , be treated under the social assistance means
test? Should such beneficiaries be prohibited from
divesting themselves of any income and assets they
have gained from the withdrawn savings so as to
qualify for social assistance?

Should it be mandatory for all or part of a withdravval benefit
resulting from a covered employee's death or attairunent of a
designated age be used to purchase of an acceptable annuity?

The responses to these questions \vill determine the extent to which the
social assistance system will be relieved of a financial burden in the future.
Program Financing
The program design questions relating to the method of financing that
need to be addressed are:

•

Should contribution rates for employees and employers be
identical? If not, what should the differential be?
14

•

Should participating employers be able to make additional
voluntary contributions? If yes , upon what basis? Regular
supplementary contributions? Ad hoc contributions?

•

Should covered employees be able to make additional
voluntary contributions? If yes , upon what basis? Regular
supplementary contributions? Ad hoc contributions?

•

Should a contribution floor be specified , as distinct from the
exemption of lower-income employees from coverage? If
yes , what should the contribution floor be?
Should
en1ployers alone be required to make contributions with
respect to covered employees whose contribution liability
falls belo\v the contribution floor?

•

Should a contribution ceiling be specified , as distinct from
the exemption of higher-income en1ployees from coverage?
If yes , \vhat should the contribution ceiling be?
How should "income" be defined for the purposes of
calculating the contribution liability? Should it only in c1 ude
earned cash income? Should it be gross taxable income
(before permitted deductions) or net taxable income? Should
it in c1 ude cash bonus , overtime or other special and one-off
payments? Should additional employment benefits (such as
allowances for housing , travel , education and clothing) be
included?

•

Should employees with multiple jobs in covered
employment be subject to multiple contribution liabilities? If
not, how is the contribution liability determined?

•

•

Should governrnent make a contribution:
•

as an employer?

•

to augment the contributions made by (or on behalf of)
employees below a designated contribution floor?

•

towards administrative costs?

Should government act as a financial guarantor of the
program? If yes , how should the investment behaviour of
工5

the constituent private provident funds be regulated to
ensure that they do not increase the risk-yield profile of their
investments in the face their own reduced cost of risk?
•

Should basic employers' contributions (and/or any permitted
supplementary contributions) be deductible from taxable
income in the year paid or trea ted as a tax credi t?

•

Should the employees' contribution (and/or any permitted
supplementary contributions) be deductible from taxable
income in the year paid or treated as a tax credit?

•

Should constituent private provident funds be subject to
income and other tax liabilities?

The responses to these questions \-v ill determine in part the complex
economic impact that mandatory occupational retirement savings programs
have on their host economies.
Mandatory occupational retirement savings programs certainly
mobilise savings ,
savings does not
The gro\-v th in
income) grea tl y

although they will only increase savings if the mandatory
induce a corresponding reduction in voluntary savings.
revenue (contributions plus investment and another
exceed the growth in expendi tures (benefi ts pl us

adlninistrative expenses) thus ensuring an accumulation of investment
funds by the constituent private provident funds . This is inevitable because
under a mandatory occupational retirement savings programs contributions
are collected for a considerable period before significant benefits payments
are lnade. Of course the extent to which interim withdrawals and borrowing
rights are permitted will diminish the rate of which these investment funds
are accumulated. The manner in which they are used is determined by any
constraints specified in its enabling statute , by the institutional arrangements
surrounding the investment decision-making process , and by the prevailing
political attitudes towards the appropriate socio-economic role of the
mandatory occupational retirement savings program.
The distributional impact of mandatory occupational retirement
savings programs is extremely difficult to determine , but hvo issues need to
be highlighted. First, with a progressive income tax rate structure , the
distributional impact of tax-deductible employee contributions is regressive.
(The degree of regressivity is , of course , restricted when a contribution
ceilings is specified.) Second, because the investment of the accumulated
16

savings by constituent private provident funds has effects throughout the
economy in which it operates , it has a bevvilderingly complex impact on the
distributions of income. There is no a priori way of knowing whether this
impact is generally progressive , neutral or regressive , or even which
segments of the community are the principal beneficiaries.
Program Administration
The program design questions relating to the program administration
that need to be addressed are:
•

What legal form should the constituent private provident
funds take? Should they be legal entities created under:
•

the enabling statute (such as statutory joint ventures
betvveen the government and one or more private
provident funds)?

•

the prevailing corporations statute?

•

another relevant statutes (such as that covering the
activities of life insurance companies)?

•

Should there be any statutory constraints on entry into the
private provident fund industry (such as the payment of a
bond , acceptable financial and governance structures , or an
acceptable ownership structure)?

•

Should there be an y constraints on the insti tutional
management (for example , covered employee representation
on the governing boards of constituent private provident
funds)?

•

Should there be mandatory covered employee participation
in contribution, benefit and investment policy decision
making?

•

What , if any , financial management constraints should be
imposed upon constituent private provident funds (for
example , mandatory investments (such as government
securities) , prohibited investments (such as commodity
futures , derivatives , investments outside Hong Kong) and
other prohibited financial transactions (such as loans to
工7

employees or loans to parent , subsidiary or associated
corporate entities)?
•

Should covered employees' have their accumulated savings
held in separate trust accounts in their own individual
names?

•

Should there be a publicly-administered appeal process to
adjudicate contribution liability and payment disputes
between the constituent private provident funds and their
covered employees and/or their participating emp1oyers? If
not, does existing statue 1aw provide sufficient remedies to
protect the rights of covered emp10yees and participating
emp10yers in the event of such disputes?
What be specified for the purpose of publicly assessing the
performance of constituent private provident funds?

•

What shou1d be the statutory right-of-access by covered
emp10yees to information stored by the constituent private
provident funds?

•

What confidentiality of information shou1d be guaranteed by
statute?

•

What shou1d be the statutory auditing requirements?

•

What statutory public accountability disclosure (reporting)
requirements shou1d apply to the constituent private
provident funds (such as , disc10sure of administrative fees
and charges , uncollected contributions , investment portfo1io
details , rate of return achieved on investments , investments
in or 10ans to parent, subsidiary or associated companies , and
the average , minimum and maximum time taken to process
withdrawa1 applications)?

•

What statutory records shou1d constituent private provident
funds be obliged to keep and for how 10ng (for examp1e ,
covered emp10yee contribution records)?

•

Should a benchmark administrative cost schedule be
specified in the enab 1ing statute for the purpose of public1y
18

assessing the performance of constituent private provident
funds?
•

，久That

should be the statutory right-of-access by covered
employees to information stored by the constituent private
provident funds?

•

What confidentiality of information should be guaranteed by
statute?
What should be the statutory auditing requirements?
statutory sanctions , at the corporate and responsibleindividual level , should government have in the event of:

﹒叭That

•

the management of a constituent private provident
fund acting contrary to the interests of contributing
employees (such as making false or deceptive
statements , failing to disc10sure re1evant information or
destroying re1evant documents)?

•

an en1p1oyee of a constituent private provident fund
causing a financial 10ss by acting illegally (such as
engaging in theft or fraud)?

•

What shou1d the statutory winding-up provisions be for
constituent private provident funds that are unab1e to meet
their financial obligations?

•

What po\vers shou1d be vested in the public regu1atory body
vvith respect to:

•

accessing contribution and benefit records , and policy
and administration files held by constituent private
provident funds?

•

undertaking periodic reviews of the management and
operation of constituent private provident funds?

•

accessing data from constituent private provident funds
for the purpose conducting studies and surveys?
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The response to these questions wiU determine , in effect, the 1eve1 of pub 1i c
trust and confidence in the envisioned mandatory occupationa1 retirement
savlngs program.

CONCLUSION
Mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings programs , like that
envisioned by the Patten administration, seek to provide retired covered
emp10yees \vith income support in the form of the withdrawa1 of their
accumu1ated net savings upon attaining a designated retirement age. Their
capacity to provide adequate income support to the aged is generally
restricted , first , by the re1ative1y slow rate of savings accumu1ation (in terms
of potentia1 income rep1acement); second , by their inability to ensure that
1ump-sum payments are used by their beneficiaries to provide 10ng-term
income support; and finally , by their inability to provide their beneficiaries
\vith a hedge against inflation. The fundamenta1 di1emma is thus that
adequate aged income support ca IU10t be achieved on the basis of mandatory
savings a1one.
The additional challenges facing the Patten administration's 1atest aged
income support reform strategy , which in effect creates a profitable regulated
market for the private sector to exp1oit, relate to the need to develop a
regulatory regime that ensures that its aged income support policy goa1s
(whatever they may be) do not become subservient to the profit goals of the
private provident funds. This requires the articulation of a set of desired
mandatory program features (embracing coverage , withdrawal
contingencies , contributions) and administrative arrangements (embracing ,
lega1 entity issues , institutiona1 governance issues , reporting and dis c1 0sure
issues , and probity issues).
The Patten administration wiU a1so have to address how it intends to to
harmonise the constituent parts of Hong Kong's socia1 security system so as
to avoid exp1oitation of the socia1 assistance system by avaricious mandatory
savings beneficiaries , perhaps to the disadvantage of those who depend
upon socia1 assistance because they are either not covered or inadequately
protected by the mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings program.
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